THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY: MORAL AGENCY
AND THE ROLE OF VICTIMS IN
REPARATIONS PROGRAMS
CARLTON WATERHOUSE*
ABSTRACT
In the ongoing debate over reparations for slavery and its
legacy in the United States, much of the reparations scholarship
pays little attention to the quality of past reparations programs
Most commentators
implemented domestically or abroad.1
emphasize the need for former wrongdoers to make apology,
recompense, or restitution rather than looking at results—namely
the restoration and recovery of victims.2 The problem is not
limited to theorists and scholars. Repeatedly, the political contests
over guilt and innocence that precede the development of
reparations programs obscure consideration of the critical role that
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1 See generally WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES
AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999) [hereinafter
WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH] (offering a comprehensive examination of domestic
and international reparations programs).
2 The rejection of reparations as a viable response to past injustice by some
commentators coupled with the popular disapproval of reparations for slavery in
the United States has led to a narrow emphasis in literature on the legal and moral
warrants for reparations. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2003)
(illuminating the ethical, legal, and institutional problems of reparations
programs). But see Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811
(2006) (arguing that the analysis in Posner and Vermeule’s article is too narrow
and rigid).
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communities and individuals suffering from past abuses should
play in establishing those programs in order to reestablish their
personal well-being and societal standing. The resulting focus on
wrongdoers replicates the former subordination of the victims of
past abuses by rendering them the passive recipients of
government actions, over which they have little or no control. This
Article advances an important but overlooked measure for
evaluating reparations programs: the role of victims in the design
and implementation process.
The increased use of reparations by governments to redress
past injustices and bring closure to the misdeeds of the past,
characterized the latter half of the twentieth century.3 While this
development, and the accompanying focus upon reparations by
the human rights community, represent genuine improvements
over the historic neglect of those abused by former regimes, few
reparations programs have been particularly “good” when viewed
from the victims’ perspective.4 In fact, when evaluated based on
their substantive rather than their symbolic restoration of victims
and their families, most programs should be classified as either
“bad” or “ugly.” My basis for this characterization arises from the
failure of most programs to afford injured groups and individuals
a meaningful role in the design and implementation of reparations
programs. As I have written elsewhere, “[e]fforts to redress past
harms can actually be counter-productive, cruel, or insulting when
they are not accompanied by actions that attend to both the needs
and agency of the injured group.”5 When using these criteria, the
3 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 694–98 (reviewing the history of
reparation schemes throughout history and noting the recent wave of reparations
that constitute the present understanding of the term). See generally ELAZAR
BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL
INJUSTICES (2000) (providing an analysis of restitution efforts across the globe since
World War II).
4 For a variety of perspectives on this topic see WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH,
supra note 1 (critiquing several modern attempts at a program of reparations).
5 Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step In A Series of Unfortunate Legal
Events: A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law from 1619 to 1972 and a
Challenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based Reparations, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
207, 222 (2006). As used here, “moral agency” refers to the ability to make moral
judgments and to act in accordance with those judgments in the world. See
generally WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds.,
1987) (exploring the relationship between moral agency and oppressive social
norms); SUSAN J. HEKMAN, MORAL VOICES, MORAL SELVES: CAROL GILLIGAN AND
FEMINIST MORAL THEORY (1995) (re-acknowledging the need for women to find
their own moral voice so as not to be marginalized by a masculine moral theory).
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inadequacy of most reparations schemes becomes apparent, due to
their primary focus on the needs and the moral agency of the
former violators. This Article engages the discourse on reparations
by focusing on the quality of domestic and international
reparations programs in light of their routine failure to attend to
the moral agency of the victims of past human rights abuses.
Governments guilty of past injustices may express moral
agency through formal apologies or even tacit acceptance of
responsibility for past human rights abuses. Through their
willingness to acknowledge past injustices and the injuries they
caused, governments act as moral agents. Their agency is further
expressed through financial or other measures directed toward
victims.
Historically, victims have been denied this same
opportunity to develop agency as most reparations programs limit
injured groups and individuals to the passive acceptance of
government actions.6 This Article maintains that injured parties
can best express moral agency through their participation in the
development and implementation of reparations programs. This
approach will allow injured parties to play an important role in the
political community through their participation in the active
remediation of their injuries.
This Article consists of three Sections. The first Section briefly
examines characteristics of the most common reparations
approaches: compensation, restitution, and reconciliation. The
second Section assesses the quality of four well-known reparations
programs based on their attention to the victims’ moral agency in
the design and implementation process.
The final Section
considers an institutional-based approach to reparations as an
underutilized means of redress that may best facilitate the moral
agency of victims.

6 While victims retain the ability to exercise their agency through the outand-out rejection of government efforts, this take it or leave it approach to
reparations frustrates both the reconciliation of the political community and the
remediation of victims’ harms. See generally ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND
FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (2004) (examining atonement
and forgiveness as a complimentary set of moral obligations placed on both
perpetrators and victims of past injustices within the context of U.S. slavery and
segregation).
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COMMON REPARATIONS APPROACHES

1.1. Compensation
The most well-known approach to reparations requires that
wrongdoers pay damages to persons harmed by the wrongdoer’s
past conduct. Popular among lawyers, compensatory reparations
authorize the payment of damages for physical, political,
psychological, economic, and other harms suffered.7
These
reparations can issue from the ruling of a court, the enactments of a
legislature, or the funds of a commission responsible for
administering transitional justice.8 Compensatory schemes range
from the establishment of victim funds used for education or
health care, to individual payments to the families or descendants
of deceased victims.9 As a method of making reparations,
compensation schemes can be beneficial or deleterious, depending
on their design.10
Through compensation programs, past violators can offer
monetary payments in a collective fund or in individual
payments.11 Accordingly, their role in reparations can be resolved
through a lump sum disbursement or one time payout. Under
7 See Roy L. Brooks, Rehabilitative Reparations for the Judicial Process, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 475, 475–77 (2003) (distinguishing compensatory reparations
from rehabilitative reparations).
8 See generally BROOKS, supra note 6 (noting some of the avenues pursued by
the Black redress movement).
9 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 694–98.
10 As discussed below, compensation schemes have accompanied the best
and the worst reparations programs. See infra Section 2. See also Hurbert Kim,
German Reparations: Institutionalized Insufficiency, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH,
supra note 1, at 77, 77–80 (pointing out the harmful insufficiencies in the German
reparation scheme to compensate victims of Nazi atrocities); Roy L. Brooks, What
Form Redress?, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 1, at 87, 88–90 (noting
many of the pitfalls associated with Japan’s response to “comfort women”).
11 See Roy L. Brooks, The Age of Apology, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra
note 1, at 3, 8–9 (previewing various compensatory reparation programs with
monetary and non-monetary components); see also Japan’s Official Response to
Reparations, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 1, at 126, 126–31 (outlining
the Asian Women’s Fund created to distribute reparations to Japanese comfort
women); see also Foreign Claims Settlement Comm’n, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, German
Compensation for National Socialist Crimes, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note
1, at 61, 61–67 (detailing the reparations made by the Germans in response to the
Nazi atrocities).
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either approach, past violators fulfill their obligation through a
discrete financial transaction that restores their moral standing and
brings ready closure to a shameful past.12 Unlike models that
require the return of land or property, discussed below, monetary
compensation offers a relatively efficient way for those making
reparations to bring finality to the process.13
Individual payment-based compensation mechanisms also
carry some advantages for recipients. Due to their individual
nature, they allow recipients to use reparations in the way that
they feel best addresses the past harms suffered by them or their
family.14 Cash payments can be used for innumerable goods and
services to redress past harms or meet existing needs or desires. In
this way, recipients can exercise autonomy in the reparations
process in order to remedy the powerlessness and subjugation they
may have suffered in the past.15 Accordingly, compensation may
be used as a valuable part of a reparations scheme that meets the
needs of victims and facilitates their involvement in the reparations
process.16 However, compensation can represent a cheap payoff or
blood money when it fails to reflect the needs or wishes of
victims.17
1.2. Restitution
Restitution represents one of the most wide-ranging
reparations options.18 Amenable to diverse applications, it can
serve to facilitate the return of real and personal property to
12 See infra Section 2.1. (providing four examples of compensatory reparations
programs, Germany’s response to the Holocaust, Japan’s response to the Korean
comfort women, America’s experience with the Indian Claims Commission, and
Argentina’s response to the victims of political violence).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See infra notes 119–31 (describing the mindset of a subsection of the
Mothers of Plaza de Mayo); cf. Mark William Bakker, Comment, Repairing the
Breach and Reconciling the Discordant: Mediation in the Criminal Justice System, 72
N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1497–98 (1994) (advocating for a system of restitution instead of
incarceration as a way to better serve victims).
18 See, e.g., Elazar Barkan, Restitution and Amending Historical Injustices in
International Morality, in POLITICS AND THE PAST: ON REPAIRING HISTORICAL
INJUSTICES 91–102 (John Torpey ed., 2003) [hereinafter POLITICS AND THE PAST]
(offering multiple examples of nations who have issued restitution and public
apologies as a means of acknowledging past wrongs and group suffering).
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previous individual owners, provide stolen wages and lost profits
to forced laborers, or repatriate tribes and clans to ancestral lands.19
This variety of uses also means that restitution’s efficiency,
effectiveness, and efficacy varies as well.20 In implementation,
restitution can range in procedural and technical complexity, from
the intricacies associated with courtroom litigation to the relative
simplicity associated with obtaining a driver’s license. Schemes
can mandate strict burdens of proof requiring documentary
ownership rights superior to all others, but may just as readily
admit oral histories that establish personal or familial possession
during a particular time.21
Accordingly, the appeal of
restitutionary reparations for past violators as well as victims will
vary widely.
Highly technical restitution mechanisms provide past violators
with a bureaucratized process that limits the number of recipients
through quasi-legal administrative procedures.22 Nevertheless, the
individualized nature of the claims and the evidentiary burdens
result in lengthy claim procedures that may involve repeated court
appeals to resolve intractable ownership questions.23 As a general
matter, these approaches construe reparations narrowly and limit
awards to those victims capable of successfully navigating the
established procedural hurdles.24 Past violators may benefit from
these mechanisms by limiting the range of recipients and the scope
of restitution in each particular year.25
However, the
Id.
Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 An alternative approach used by some governments to address land claims
provides qualifying claimants with compensation or available land tracts rather
than restoration of original lands. Under this policy, governments can avoid the
technical and legal challenges associated with resolving competing claims for
specific property. Moreover, this methodology offers past violators a more
efficient and less costly way to administer restitution programs to a larger number
of recipients by decreasing administrative and legal costs. For the claimants, this
mechanism offers a less bureaucratic and technical system to recover lost property
or its value. In exchange, however, claimants surrender their right to obtain
specific property that may have an incommensurable sacramental or sentimental
value. Under either approach, Barkan makes clear that restitution awards
represent negotiated redress of past injustices that fit into a larger narrative about
national identity that reconciles past actions with contemporary notions of justice
and desert. BARKAN, supra note 3, at 320–21.
24 Id.
25 Id.
19
20
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administrative costs and the political exposure associated with
slow moving individual based mechanisms can present significant
challenges to the long-term viability of these mechanisms. An
additional benefit of these means for some past violators will be
the ability to construct the future society by determining the
beneficiaries of substantial assets reverting to private ownership.26
Elazar Barkan makes clear that in Eastern Europe, more often than
not, members of the pre-communist middle class typically
benefited from restitution schemes.27 This results from the
temporal nature of restitution and its dependence upon a “rightful
ownership” rooted in history.28 Rather than restoring property to
those with earliest ownership or those “most entitled to it,”
restitution seeks a particular time that predates a recent injustice to
support a claim.29 In Eastern Europe, this meant that countries
considered restitution claims for property taken under the
communist regime, but excluded claims rooted in procommunist
property appropriations.30 In doing so, governments sought to
redress communist injustices but not those of the preceding
regimes.31 This temporal characteristic creates difficult legal and
moral challenges when claimants offer competing prior claims of
ownership for restitution. As seen with the history of the United
States Indian Claims Commission, discussed below, restitution can
be a nightmare for victims.32 Although restitution holds the
unique potential to return the real and personal property
wrongfully taken from victims, the procedures that accompany it
can easily deteriorate into a bureaucratic nightmare for victims that
can rob the process of its reparative potential.33
1.3. Apology, Atonement, and Reconciliation
In some cases, reparations take the form of a reconciliation
process. These processes consist of apologies and symbolic awards
Id.
Id. at 118–19 (explaining that in Eastern Europe the goal of economic
development was often chosen at the expense of a logical, comprehensive and
moralistic restitution scheme).
28 See Id. at 118–19.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 120.
31 Id.
32 See infra notes 79–87.
33 BARKAN, supra note 3, at 120–21.
26
27
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or projects as part of a broader process of reconciling victims and
those responsible for harming them.34 Roy Brooks argues that
awards offered in conjunction with an apology constitute
atonement by past violators that warrant forgiveness by victims.35
Under this theory, the reconciliation of the parties represents the
primary component of reparations.36 The primary goal of these
approaches flows from a drive to repair broken relationships
caused by past injustices.37 Atonement awards represent a
symbolic gesture by past violators of the good faith of their
apology.38 When past injustices resist material redress, symbolic
acts provide past violators with an opportunity to show their
remorse and commitment not to repeat the unjust behavior.39
These actions can take a variety of forms including individual
compensation awards, community memorial funds, the creation of
monuments and museums, the development and support of
educational and cultural awareness programs, the establishment of
national holidays, and the national commemoration of victims.40
Most of these activities seek to enshrine the recognition of past
injustices in the national memory and to honor the communities or
individuals who suffered at the hands of past violators.41 In a
discussion of the “anatomy of apology” Brooks explains:

34 See Id. at 120. See also Roy L. Brooks, Getting Reparations For Slavery Right—
A Response To Posner And Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 251, 274–75 (2004)
(explaining that in many cases reconciliation and redress require a degree of
remorse that should couple something tangible with the apology in order to be
meaningful).
35 BROOKS, supra note 6, at 155–56 (noting the most integral parts of
reparations as a reconciliation tool).
36 Id. (discussing an ideal model for reparations to ensure authenticity).
37 Id.
38 Id. See also Roy L. Brooks, Toward A Perpetrator-Focused Model of Slave
Redress, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 49, 67 (2004) (explaining that perpetrators must
acknowledge guilt through a tangible act demonstrating acknowledgement and
also ask for forgiveness in order to mend antagonistic feelings between victims,
and sometimes their descendants, and perpetrators).
39 BROOKS, supra note 6, at 155–56.
See also Mia Swart, Name Changes as
Symbolic Reparation After Transition: The Examples of Germany and South Africa, 9
GERMAN L.J. 105, 107–108 (2008) (discussing the changing of names as a restorative
measure to aid in the victim rehabilitation process).
40 BROOKS, supra note 6, at 156.
41 Id. See also Swart, supra note 39, at 106 (noting that the changing of a street
name can have at least three functions: a vehicle for commemoration, a form of
symbolic reparation for human rights abuse, and constructing a politicized
version of history).
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A tender of apology is no trivial matter, particularly when
made by state officials on behalf of their governments. It is
an act fraught with deep meaning and important
consequences.
Let us begin with some understanding of what apology is
and is not in the context of atonement. Apology, most
importantly, is an acknowledgment of guilt rather than a
punishment for guilt. When a government perpetrates an
atrocity and apologizes for it, it does four things: confesses
the deed; admits the deed was an injustice; repents; and
asks for forgiveness.42
This process and other reconciliation efforts offer victims
recognition and standing in the current social order and allows
past violators to regain moral standing domestically and
internationally.43 Although these mechanisms themselves can
provide past violators with the smallest financial burden
associated with reparations, the strong repudiation of the behavior
of past regimes as well as the fear of future civil suits can deter
governments from adopting this approach because of its political
and/or psychic costs.44 In contrast, victims focused on current
societal standing, as well as those focused on addressing the
emotional cost of a painful history, may gravitate toward
reconciliation as a reparations mechanism because of the social and
psychic benefits it provides.45
42 BROOKS, supra note 6, at 144 (emphasis in original). Brooks goes on to note
that government-based apologies play the vital role of clarifying often contentious
historical records regarding past injustices. Id. at 148–51. In South Africa, the
need to elaborate the record of past injustices led to a grant of amnesty for
perpetrators of gross human rights abuses in exchange for open testimony
detailing the atrocities inflicted during the previous regime. See generally
DESMOND MPILO TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (1999) (explaining the
South African reconciliation process and the subordination of retributive justice in
order to discover the truth about the past).
43 BROOKS, supra note 6, at 144–48. Additionally, Elazar Barkan argues that at
the very minimum these apologies lead to a reformulated historical
understanding that is itself a form of restitution and becomes a factor in
contemporary politics and humanitarian actions. BARKAN, supra note 3, at 98–99.
44 In 1996, Australia elected a more conservative government that deemphasized and de-funded the reconciliation efforts of the previous
administration. This exemplifies how a government might reject reconciliation in
order to preserve dominant political ideologies the roots of which can be found in
historic notions of national identity. See BROOKS, supra note 6, at 153.
45 See id. at 143, 170.
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The contemporary focus on truth commissions works within
the reconciliation model because of its ability to promote healing
between victims and violators in the wake of gross human rights
abuses.46
These commissions take diverse approaches, but
regularly focus on unveiling the mystery surrounding the fate of
disappeared and murdered community members. To facilitate
this, governments may offer amnesty to perpetrators of human
rights abuses in exchange for their testimony.47 This mechanism
allows societies to promote healing between perpetrators and
victims using amnesty and confessions rather than tribunals and
retribution.48 The clandestine nature of many abuses in such
countries as South Africa and Chile has created considerable angst
about the death and disappearance of countless loved ones.49 The
truth and reconciliation commissions in these and other countries
facilitate a very public process of confession, in order to allow
perpetrators and victims to reconcile and shape a new future for
their society.50 Unfortunately, in both South Africa and Chile,
officials and other known perpetrators refuse to participate in
criminal prosecution and confession. Their lack of participation
raises questions about the effectiveness of the reconciliation
process.

Id. at 147–148.
Id.
48 Truth commissions offer possibilities for moving beyond political violence
at a collective level. This is partly a consequence of their public recognition of
suffering and collaborative efforts to understand the complete story of the past.
See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 79 (1998); see generally
Roslyn Myers, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 101: What TRCs Can Teach the
United States Justice System About Justice, 78 U.P.R. JUR. REV. 95 (2009) (recounting
the purpose and the effectiveness of truth and reconciliation commissions).
49 See MINOW, supra note 48, at 66–70 (describing the emotional consequences
and the restorative power of truth commissions in South Africa and Chile).
50 Id.; see also Myers, supra note 48, at 115–16 (“In the South African TRC, the
needs of the victims drove the proceedings: the victims’ pursuit of information
about what happened to loved ones who disappeared; their need to have their
suffering acknowledged by the wider community; their desire to hear
perpetrators admit to their abuses; and their hope to have the local and
international community react with indignation and empathy.”); see generally
Naomi Cahn, Beyond Retribution and Impunity: Responding To War Crimes of Sexual
Violence, 1 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 217, 219 (2005) (exploring possible
responses to “crimes of sexual violence in the context of post-conflict justice”).
46
47
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REPARATIONS RECONSIDERED

The historic implementation of reparations schemes across the
globe often consists of a mixture of the above approaches. In some
cases, governments limit reparations exclusively to one of the
above mechanisms, while in exceptional cases governments
implement a comprehensive scheme using a configuration of all
the above mechanisms.51 The Federal Republic of Germany
(“FRG”) provides the seminal case of comprehensive reparations.
In that instance, the FRG used compensation, restitution, and
reconciliation in providing redress for the victims of the
Holocaust.52
The program used by Germany included
compensation to individual victims and the state of Israel,
restitution for stolen property and forced labor, apology, and a
variety of domestic reconciliation projects.53
Unlike reparations undertaken by the FRG, most reparations
schemes routinely emphasize the actions of past violators to define
and evaluate reparations, thereby maintaining the continued
subordination of victims and the primary importance of violators.54
This approach can provide past violators with an almost unilateral
ability to decide, if, when, and how to make reparations, with little
regard to the victims’ views or role in the design and
implementation of reparations programs.55 The actions of victims
under this model are a secondary consideration relative to the chief

51 Roy L. Brooks, Reflections on Reparations, in POLITICS AND THE PAST, supra
note 18, at 106–07; see also Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of AfricanAmerican Reparations To Redirect America’s Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689 (2002)
(arguing the need for reparations in order to heal the racial divide in the United
States).
52 Brooks, supra note 51, at 108, 112.
53 See United States Dep’t of Justice, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
German Compensation for National Socialist Crimes, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH,
supra note 1, at 61–65 (describing Germany’s reparations to victims of the
Holocaust).
54 Theo Van Boven, Victims’ Rights to a Remedy and Reparation: The New United
Nations Principles and Guidelines, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR
CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 19–21 (Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz, &
Alan Stephens eds., 2009) (highlighting the growing recognition of reparations in
human rights discourse responds to this phenomenon by elevating the
significance of victims rights in reparations programs).
55 Id; see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 170–72 (2004) (describing the reparation
methods employed by various South American countries in the wake of the
military dictatorships occurring from 1970–1990).
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concern over what actions past violators take.56 The typical
reparations scheme also provides inadequate attention to the
material needs of victims.57 Instead, these approaches emphasize
the restoration of the moral standing of past violators in the
political community. This routinely manifests in reconciliation
efforts intended to symbolize the restoration of social harmony
within the political community.58 These efforts regularly sacrifice
attention to the material needs and losses of past victims in favor of
restoring social accord among community members. Instead of a
careful assessment of the steps required to enable victims to
overcome the deficits of past injustices, reparations typically
emphasize the remorse and regret of violators over the needs of
victims.59 While all of the above efforts can represent important
aspects of good reparations programs, they hinder effective
reparations when they are out of balance with the proper attention
to the wellbeing and engagement of past victims.60
The result of the imbalance manifests in negative and harmful
consequences that undermine the ultimate efficacy of reparations
programs. The first of these is the continued subordination of
victims relative to governmental actors.
Most reparations
programs reflect government efforts to redress past governmental
harms perpetrated against citizens or other residents of a country.61
Because the original wrongs redressed by reparations flowed from
the misuse or abuse of government power relative to persons or
56 See generally WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 1 (collecting various
authors’ accounts of the multitude of reparations regimes in the latter half of the
twentieth century).
57 See Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF
REPARATIONS 451, 457–58 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) (discussing the similar
shortcomings between the reparations schemes from South Africa, Peru, and the
victims of September 11); see also Cecily Rose, Looking Beyond Amnesty and
Traditional Justice and Reconciliation Mechanisms in Northern Uganda: A Proposal for
Truth-Telling and Reparations, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 345, 385–86 (2008)
(discussing the Ugandan government’s failure to respond to the victims’ need for
reparations while granting amnesty and resettlement packages to the
perpetrators).
58 See Van Boven, supra note 54, at 2 (arguing that one purpose of the
commission is to correct social history).
59 For an examination of the role of regret in reparations policy see Jeffrey K.
Olick & Brenda Coughlin, The Politics of Regret: Analytical Frames, in Politics in the
Past 37 (John Torpey ed., 2003).
60 See Van Boven, supra note 54, at 19 (stating that remorse plays a key role
when styling systems of reparations).
61 See generally WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 1.
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groups within a society, the creation of reparations based primarily
on government concessions or symbolic gestures to past victims
can continue the neglect of those harmed.62 Consequently,
government violators may avoid responsibility for the
deterioration of victims’ socio-economic conditions following
reparations or reconciliation efforts by noting that, in light of their
attempted corrections, any failure by victims to succeed is
unrelated to past injustices.63 This rationale can easily become the
dominant discourse in societies where victims belong to minority
groups that suffered historic mistreatment.64 In these cases,
officials and other segments of society expect victimized persons
and communities to compete equally, despite the failure of
reparations schemes to adequately redress the harms caused by
past injustices.65
An equally significant shortcoming in many reparations
schemes takes place in the design process. When countries
contemplate ways to overcome the misdeeds of the past, they may
see victims as passive agents who receive compensation or accept
symbolic gestures as recognition of their mistreatment.66 This view
of victims fails to recognize the importance of victims’ active
engagement in the reparations process, from its design and
implementation, to its conclusion and evaluation.67 Victims’
62 For consideration of the overwhelming rejection of the Asian Woman’s
fund by the surviving Korean Comfort Women and other groups see infra notes
100–110 and accompanying text.
63 See Bernadette Atuahene, From Reparations to Restoration: Moving Beyond
Restoring Property Rights to Restoring Political and Economic Visibility, 60 SMU L.
REV. 1419, 1444–445 (2007) (maintaining that a society dedicated to moral
restoration must find a way to integrate victims of atrocities into the social fabric
to affirm their humanity).
64 Many contemporary views in American society regarding African
Americans reflect this phenomenon. See JOE FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS,
CURRENT REALITIES AND FUTURE REPARATIONS 105–36 (Routledge 2001).
65 Id. at 127–128.
66 The official Japanese response to the harms done to Korean comfort
women serves as one example. Japan’s Official Responses to Reparations, supra note
11, at 126–31.
67 The International Criminal Court awards victims the right to participate
other than as witnesses in the court proceedings providing their participation
does not infringe upon the rights of the accused. Under this new framework,
victims have the right to counsel, and at present, victims’ participation extends to
issues over reparation claims, jurisdiction, investigations, indictments,
amendments, interim release, and disclosure, question of witnesses, admissibility
and relevancy of evidence, sentencing and other decisions of the court. Brianne
N. McGonigle, Bridging the Divides in International Criminal Proceedings: An
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participation in the design of reparations enables them to see
themselves healing and to articulate the steps needed to see that
healing accomplished. Moreover, victims’ involvement in the
design process enables them to make sacrifices as well as demands,
in order to promote the good of the larger community in addition
to their own.68
Further, victims’ involvement in designing
reparations also helps elevate their status in the reparations
process in its initial stages, increasing the likelihood that they will
be included as equal parties throughout.69
In the implementation stages, victims’ ability to participate
actively in a reparative process bolsters their healing, as well as the
society’s advancement.
Through active participation and
engagement, victims become vested participants in a reformed or
changed society, transcending their former identity as those
aggrieved by a former regime.70
This visible engagement,
accompanied with the support needed to overcome past
mistreatment, not only provides superior short-term benefits for
victims, but also improves the long-term prospects for healing
societal wounds by increasing victims’ ability to overcome the
harms of the past and to take part in society.71 This approach can
decrease the likelihood that bitterness and anger will pass down
through generations to destabilize countries long after original
transgressions. Although the shape of reparations programs
should always reflect the context of the situation and the country
in which they take place, below the Article elaborates on how
institutional development represents one way that victims of
reparations can actively engage in the reparative process and
meaningfully exercise their moral agency.

Examination into the Victim Participation Endeavor of the International Criminal Court,
21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 93, 110–111 (2009) (discussing victims’ participatory role in
international criminal proceedings when dealing with issues such as reparations).
68 Barkan, supra note 18, at 93.
69 Id. (describing the successes of the Roma people due to the increased
attention given by the European Union)
70 Id.
71 At a minimum, healing denotes re-establishing a connection to the
meaning in life, in such a way that victims contemplate a future for themselves.
See Myers, supra note 48, at 90 (emphasizing the need for victims to be the focal
point in the healing process).
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2.1. Reparations Cases Reviewed
Reparations typically flow from efforts to redress historical
practices that contemporary moral theory deems anathema.72
Current understandings of reparations, as a practice related to
individuals or groups rather than entire countries, can be traced
back to the Federal Republic of Germany’s response to the gross
atrocities committed by Nazi Germany.73 This resulted in the first
provision of reparations to a non-state entity. In the wake of the
Holocaust, the Federal Republic of Germany provided a robust
reparations scheme.74 The program provided for three reparations
mechanisms to redress Nazi atrocities: first, supplying the State of
Israel with goods and services; second, directly compensating Jews
victimized by Nazi’s; and third, funding the relief and resettlement
of persecuted Jews to Israel.75
Another reparations case related to World War II is that of the
Korean Comfort Women. This matter originated in the sexual
enslavement and forced prostitution of women and girls by the
Japanese army from 1931 to 1944.76 During this period, Japan used
deception and abduction to force some two hundred thousand,
mostly Korean, women and girls into prostitution.77 In response to
international and domestic pressure, Japan established a
72 See RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 119 (2000) (discussing reparations
and the conception of justice as contextualized and partial because what is
deemed just is contingent and informed by prior injustice); see also Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 2, at 694–95 (illustrating how modern reparations schemes
respond to tragedy).
73 United States Dep’t of Justice, supra note 53, at 61–67.
74 Id. at 62.
75 Id. See also Posner and Vermeule, supra note 2, at 694 (“[T]he Holocaust
case differs from the standard cases of coerced wartime reparations. The
Holocaust reparations did not go to the victorious powers, and the program
emerged more or less autonomously from the German political system . . . .”). See
generally Kurt Schwerin, German Compensation for Victims of Nazi Persecution, 67
NW. U. L. REV. 479 (1972) (detailing the process that went into Germany creating
laws and establishing proceedings to compensate the victims of Nazi
Persecution); Roy L. Brooks, The Slave Redress Cases, 27 N.C. CENT. L.J. 130, 141–42
(2005).
76 BARKAN, supra note 3, at 47. See Brooks, supra note 10, at 88–90 (explaining
the use of the Korea’s Comfort Women as prostitutes for the Japanese army).
77 United States Dep’t of Justice, supra note 53, at 126–31.
See also
Waterhouse, supra note 5, at 222 (“Japan’s handling of reparations for Korean
comfort women during War World II . . . provide[s] examples of how
government-based reparations programs often frustrate, rather than fulfill, efforts
to redress the wounds of past injustice.”).
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reparations fund for surviving victims and the Japanese prime
minister personally apologized for the atrocities.78 In the wake of
World War II, the United States began its own reparations process
for Native Americans with the establishment if the Indian Claims
Commission (“ICC”). Beginning in 1946, the ICC presided over the
restitution and reparations of tribal claims against the United
States and its citizens for the taking of Indian properties, treaty
violations, and other infractions against tribes and their members.79
One less well-known but equally interesting reparations case is
found in the Argentinean response to the political violence carried
out by successive military regimes from 1975 and 1983.80 During
the period, known as the “Dirty War,” 15,000 to 30,000 civilians
were killed.81 In addition to the military regimes’ detention,
torture, and incarceration of those believed to have leftist
connections, large numbers of civilians were taken by the military
executed and without admission, acknowledgement or the return
of their remains.82 These became known as the “disappeared.”83
To redress these grave human rights abuses, subsequent
democratic governments approved a number of compensation and
other programs for the broad classes of persons who suffered
under the regime.84 The initial laws passed reinstated public
servants, employees of state controlled companies, teachers, and
bank workers dismissed for political reasons.85 A second set of
laws provided pensions to the spouses and children of the
disappeared that included health care and pharmaceutical

78 George Hicks, The Comfort Women Redress Movement, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T
ENOUGH, supra note 1, 113, 118.
79 Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims for Reparations, Compensation, and
Restitution in the United States Legal System, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra
note 1, at 261–66. See also Zachary F. Bookman, Note, A Role for Courts in
Reparations, 20 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 75, 86–87 (2006) (explaining how the government
sanctioned reparations program for Native Americans fail to address the needs of
the very people they are trying address).
80 Maria Jose Guembe, Economic Reparations for Grave Human Rights Violations:
The Argentinian Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 57 at 21,
21–22.
81 Christina Marie Wilson, Note, Argentina’s Reparation Bonds: An Analysis of
Continuing Obligations, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 786, 794 (2005).
82 Id. at 794–95.
83 Id.
84 Guembe, supra note 80, at 31–44.
85 Id. at 23–24.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/5

2009]

THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY

273

benefits.86 Subsequently, numerous laws were passed to provide
substantial compensation for detainees, the successors of the
assassinated and the disappeared, persons born while their
mothers were detained, minors detained or held based on their
parents’ detention, children sold or wrongfully placed with other
families due to their parents’ detention or disappearance, and
those forced into exile.87
Looking at the four reparations programs above, under this
analysis, none could be considered good, two could be considered
bad, and two could be considered ugly. The FRG program for
Jewish victims of the Holocaust represents the most sweeping and
extensive reparations program in modern history.88 Though some
consider it a highly successful reparations program, under my
analysis, it approximates a good program yet still falls short.89
Because the program grew out of negotiations with a wellorganized group representing Holocaust victims, the mechanism
reflected a deeper appreciation for victims’ wishes and desires than
most.90 Moreover, the program directed substantial resources that
supported institutional development in Israel which would benefit
victims over the long term. This aspect was reflected in Germany’s
provision of goods and services to Israel as well as by the
Id. at 26.
Id. at 31–44.
88 German Compensation for National Socialist Crimes, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T
ENOUGH, supra note 1, at 61–67. See also Kim, supra note 10, at 77–78
(“Unprecedented in its scale, the German plan has been extolled as a model
redress scheme, with few doubting Germany’s willingness to accept its moral
responsibility for the dark chapters of its Nazi past, or its genuine desire to
compensate those it victimized.”).
89 Roy L. Brooks, A Reparations Success Story, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH,
supra note 1, at 17. See generally Menachem Z. Rosensaft & Joana D. Rosensaft, The
Early History of German-Jewish Reparations, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, S–1 (2001)
(explaining that although the voluntarily negotiated reparations program had a
profound impact on German-Jewish relations, it is unlikely that anyone paid
much attention to the relatively insubstantial individual claims of the Holocaust
survivors).
90 It bears noting that the quick response following the end of the war
effectively increased the overall accomplishments of the program. In most of the
other cases considered, the substantial time lag between the harms inflicted upon
victims and the decision to provide redress significantly hindered the success of
the program. Expeditious attention to the development of reparations programs
increases both the quantity and quality of victim participation. Even when
enduring hostilities impede expeditious attention to reparations, a government
can improve the quality and the effectiveness of reparations programs by
engaging a reparations process at the conclusion of hostilities.
86
87
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Although this
resettlement of persecuted Jews to Israel.91
mechanism failed to achieve the goal of reforming institutions
within German society that allow the active engagement and
participation of victims in the type of reparative process articulated
above, it served a similar function by supporting the development
of a society focused on and committed to creating and sustaining
those institutions. Consequently, Israel’s development as a society
provided Holocaust victims with both the responsibility and the
opportunity to participate in their own repair and restoration. In
terms of the victims’ moral agency, the FRG program provides
significant glimpses of how prioritizing victims’ engagement in the
design and implementation of reparations can help improve the
long-term success of reparations programs by supporting victims’
participation in their own repair and restoration.
Unfortunately, the FRG program still suffered from substantial
problems that mar its standing as a model for future reparations
programs. The limited scope of the program in reaching all the
victims of the Nazi regime, particularly Eastern European Jews,
Roma, and homosexuals, was one significant flaw.
The
inadequacy of the assistance provided former victims was
another.92 These issues keep the FRG settlement from being
classified as “good.”
The reparations for Korean comfort women and the ICC
exemplify bad reparations programs. In both cases, the victims
played a minimal role in the program design, development, and
implementation.93 Instead, Japanese and American bureaucrats
respectively created a scheme and then informed the victims of its
existence. This top-down approach to reparations increases the
likelihood that programs will fail to redress past injustices in a
meaningful way.
Through legislation following World War II, the United States
established the ICC to settle all Indian claims that arose before
1946.94 Although the ICC made some monetary awards, claimants
found themselves enmeshed in highly technical adversarial
litigation against the Department of Justice that frustrated and
91 Foreign Claims Settlement Comm’n, United States Dept. of Justice, German
Compensation for National Socialist Crimes http://www.ushmm.org/assets
/frg.htm (last updated March 6, 1996).
92 Kim, supra note 10, at 77–80.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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impeded their success.95 Despite its substantial and unique
importance to claimants, the ICC refused to provide the restoration
of land rights.96 The victims suffered additional adversity in the
process through their interaction with private counsel, whose
interests often differed from their clients and resulted in the loss of
claims.97 Although Congress authorized a less formal and more
cooperative program through its legislation, allowing the
Commission to address moral as well as legal claims, the ICC gave
little thought to the effect of the program on victims, and imposed
a rigid legal structure that marginalized claimants and their
cultural perspective.98 Instead, victims had to prove claims and
meet substantial procedural barriers to participate in the program.
Beyond this, the adversarial nature of the proceedings alienated
victims and frustrated attempts to obtain restitution for the gross
injustices they suffered. The ICC process not only neglected the
moral agency of victims to participate actively in the repair or
restoration of their communities and their well-being, but also
failed to provide sufficient restitution for many claimants in light
of the losses they suffered.99
Likewise, the fund set up by the Japanese parliament for the
“Korean Comfort Women” suffered from the insufficient
participation of victims in its design and intended operation.100
Under the program, the Japanese government created the “The
Asian Women’s Fund” for the benefit of former comfort women.101
The Japanese Parliament only funded administrative operations,
however, and left it up to the Japanese people to fund the corpus
through their charity.102 The fund made amounts available to
“support medical and welfare projects” which would “be of

Id.
Newton, supra note 79, at 263–267.
97 Id. at 264.
98 Id. at 263. See generally GEORGE HICKS, THE COMFORT WOMEN: JAPAN’S
BRUTAL REGIME OF ENFORCED PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1995)
(detailing an in-depth examination of the history of the “comfort women” and the
events leading up to the development of the fund).
99 Newton, supra note 79, at 263–64.
100 Id. See also Byoungwook Park, Comfort Women During WWII: Are U.S.
Courts A Final Resort For Justice?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 403 (2002) (explaining
how the Comfort Women face an ongoing, difficult task of getting their claims
settled).
101 Japan’s Official Responses to Reparations, supra note 11, at 129–131.
102 Id.
95
96
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service” to the former comfort women and Fund representatives
engaged in dialogues with former comfort women regarding
projects that the fund might undertake.103 Ultimately, the fund
provided “atonement money” for each individual consisting of
approximately $17,000 (U.S.), a letter of apology from both the
Prime Minister of Japan and the Fund President, and access to
some medical services to less than 20 women in the Republic of
Korea.104
Rather than meaningfully aiding Korean women, the fund
further stigmatized and marginalized past victims who saw it as a
provision of charity donated by Japanese citizens, rather than a just
compensation scheme as requested by victims and others.105 The
program failed to recognize the cultural context of victims and
neglected to address their numerous concerns.106 The fund also
placed a burden on victims to prove their victimization.107 Further,
the Japanese government failed to accept responsibility for the
deception and force used to abduct and sexually enslave over one
hundred thousand Korean women.108 Out of protest against the
Japanese government, few of the nearly 200 surviving victims
participated in the program. To support victims rejecting the
Japanese award, the South Korean government provided
comparable benefits to Korean victims who refused the Japanese
offer.109
The reparations program Japan implemented was doomed
from the onset due to its failure to take meaningful account of the
surviving Korean comfort women’s moral agency in the program’s
initial design and subsequent development.110
Rather than
honoring the victims’ views and working collaboratively with

103 Id. See also Jon M. Van Dyke, Reconciliation between Korea and Japan, 5
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 215, 234–35 nn.104–109 (2006) (explaining how funds would be
distributed amongst the many different Comfort Women victims).
104 The
Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund,
http://www.awf.or.jp/e3/korea.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
105 Hicks, supra note 78, at 113, 124.
106 Id. See generally Mary Margaret Penrose, Impunity—Inertia, Inaction, and
Invalidity: A Literature Review, 17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 269, 300–02 (1999) (detailing how
the Japanese government disturbingly continues to avoid legal responsibility and
liability for its appalling system of Comfort Women).
107 Guembe, supra note 80, at 36–37.
108 Hicks, supra note 78, at 122.
109 The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund, supra note 104.
110 Id.
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them to establish an acceptable program of reparations, the
government initially refuted responsibility and only sought
“dialogue” with victims as an afterthought.
Japan further
111
alienated the Korean victims in two ways.
By offering meager
awards to survivors, the Japanese government conveyed the
message that these atrocities were mere inconveniences rather than
drastic blows to the mental and physical health of the victims.
Japan also alienated victims by refusing their request to identify
and publicly acknowledge the responsibility of the perpetrators of
the atrocities.112
The Argentinean reparations program represents one of the
most broad and victim-focused reparations programs to date. The
compensation mechanism used in most instances calculated victim
remuneration levels based on the compensation and benefits
provided to the highest-ranked civil servants.113 This formula
established a spectrum of financial redress dependent upon the
harm suffered.114 The program provided both financial and
healthcare benefits to families who had lost the material support of
one or more members due to the forced disappearance exacted by
the former regimes.115 The substantial depth of the support was
complemented by the breadth of the program which extended
across the range of the government’s victims and even included
foreign nationals within Argentina who suffered during the “Dirty
War.”116
The extension of reparations to the full range of the military
regimes’ victims was steady but far from immediate—it took the
government a little over a decade to pass the most important
reparations legislation, some of which extended reparations to
additional categories of victims.117 Argentinean human rights
groups played a significant role in reparations discussions over the
two decades.118 While the specific details of their involvement

Id.
Hicks, supra note 78, at 122–23.
113 Guembe, supra note 80, at 30.
114 The program awarded detainees compensation based on the length of
detainment with increased amounts for injuries suffered while detained and a
maximum increase for those who died during detention. Id. at 32.
115 Id. at 26.
116 Id. at 42.
117 Id. at 27.
118 Guembe, supra note 80, at 22.
111
112
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warrant further examination, the influence of victims’ groups,
including the two organizations making up Mothers of Plaza de
Mayo, seem clear.119 Government reparations programs sought
and were responsive to the input of victims, their families and the
Nonetheless, when
organizations that represented them.120
examined closely, the case highlights important challenges facing
both compensation programs and victim participation in the
design of an appropriate reparations program. A substantial
disagreement took place within Mothers of Plaza de Mayo
regarding reparations for the families of the disappeared.121 One
group, Mothers of Plaza de Mayo Association, opposed reparations
whether economic or simply in the form of an apology from the
government.122 They maintained that families receiving economic
reparations were “prostituting” themselves.123 The other group,
Mothers of Plaza de Mayo—Founding Group, took a contrary
position.124 They supported reparations and contended that
families should have the choice of claiming reparations or not on
behalf of disappeared loved ones.125 The government finally
adopted this approach—making reparations an optional benefit
available to victims’ families.126 Because the vast majority of
victims’ families and their advocate groups endorsed this
approach, the difference of opinion within the community was
readily resolved. Despite the risk of disagreement, however,
reparations programs that reflect the views, needs, and desires of
victims have greater legitimacy and effectiveness.127
Despite the foregoing, Argentina’s program falls short of the
attributes of a “good” program. Though the harms addressed and
the beneficiaries covered were extensive, the program was
somewhat marred by the nature of the reparations. The use of
Id. at 38–39.
Id.
121 Id. at 25.
122 Id.
123 Guembe, supra note 80, at 38.
124 Id. at 25.
125 Id. at 38.
126 Id.
127 It is true that governments risk being placed between competing views of
reparations and potentially losing popular and political support for programs
ultimately developed. However, they can obviate that risk through the use of
consensus-building mechanisms within organizational structures created to
facilitate victim participation in the design of a reparations program.
119
120
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public bonds by a poor and weak state did not guarantee
reparation awards. Also, the fact that recipients had to wait sixteen
years to redeem the bonds, although both capital and interest
payments were to be paid in the interim, hampered
compensation.128 Due to a debt crisis in 2001, Argentina defaulted
on its internal and external debt obligations, including reparations
bonds.129 This resulted in the reduction of the value of some
awards by as much as 70% and the temporary suspension of
capital and interest payments to the beneficiaries.130 Since 2001,
victims holding reparations bonds have lacked certainty regarding
the extent of the economic support they can finally expect under
the plan. Moreover, by conditioning reparations awards on bond
redemption, the government placed beneficiaries at risk of default
and within the structure of a highly technical securities mechanism
that can be difficult to navigate.131 As a result, this program, like
the FRG’s, falls somewhere between good and ugly.
Consistent with the growing number of reparations and
restitution-based actions worldwide, the United Nations formally
addressed these issues in the 1990s through the work of the U.N.
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities.132 This Sub-Commission’s work, formally developed
through the efforts of Special Rapporteurs, Theo van Boven and M.
Cherif Bassiouni, ultimately resulted in the U.N. General Assembly
adopting the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law in 2006.133 This Resolution
Guembe, supra note 80, at 40–41.
Wilson, supra note 81, at 788–89.
130 Id. at 789. See also Guembe, supra note 80, at 41 (detailing the suspension
of capital and interest payments to beneficiaries).
131 Guembe, supra note 80, at 44.
132 United Nations General Assembly, Draft: Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, (2004)
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/events/meetings/docs/versionrev
.doc (Original draft of G.A. Res. 60/147). See generally Zakia Afrin, Foreign Direct
Investments and Sustainable Development in the Least-Developed Countries, 10 ANN.
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 215, 223–24 (2004) (discussing a United Nations Resolution
addressing norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other
business enterprises with regard to human rights).
133 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
128
129
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adopted principles that present specific obligations on states guilty
of human rights violations.134
The principles in the Resolution relating to victims of human
rights violations formally acknowledge restitution and
compensation as remedial or reparative mechanisms to address
past injustices.135 The aforementioned reparations cases also
envisioned diverse means and mechanisms for addressing historic
injustices.
Redress, restitution, reconciliation, remediation,
rehabilitation, recollection, retribution, compensation, and apology
are all terms that have been associated with the issue of
reparations.136 The shared characteristic of each of these terms is
an intention to correct or otherwise harmonize the past and the
present. As a compliment to these mechanisms, this Article
proposes an institutional model of reparations that promotes the

Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Basic Principles and Guidelines
Resolution]. See also Christopher Keith Hall, UN Convention on State Immunity: The
Need for a Human Rights Protocol, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 411, 413–14 (2006)
(discussing how the rights of victims and their families to recover reparations for
crimes under international law has been confirmed in a number of international
instruments).
134 Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the U.N. General Assembly’s Basic Principles and
Guidelines Resolution, provides:
19. Restitution should, wherever possible, restore the victim to the
original situation before the violations of international human rights law
or serious violations humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes, as
appropriate: restoration of liberty; enjoyment of human rights, identity,
family life and citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration
of employment and return of property.
20. Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable
damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation
and the circumstances of each case, resulting from gross violations of
international human rights law and serious violations of international
humanitarian law, such as: (a) Physical or mental harm; (b) Lost
opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits; (c)
Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning
potential; (d) Moral damage; (e) Costs required for legal or expert
assistance, medicines and medical services, and psychological and social
services. (emphasis omitted).
Id. ¶¶ 19–20.
135 Id. pmbl.
136 Id. See generally Roy L. Brooks, Getting Reparations for Slavery Right—A
Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 251, 270–272 (2004)
(outlining the different types of redress available to victims).
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participation of victims in the existing institutions of the societies
in which they suffered historic injustices.
3.

INSTITUTIONAL REPARATIONS: THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIMENT

The human rights community and commentators have focused
on the use of truth commissions, compensation, and restitution to
respond to historic injustices. This focus has overshadowed the
role of political, economic, and educational institutions in the
reparations process. Although space does not allow for a full
elaboration of the importance of these institutions in the
reparations process, the remainder of this Article takes note of this
theoretical limitation in the literature through consideration of the
often-omitted role of economic institutions in the reparations
process for groups subjected to historic injustices.137
The situation of post-apartheid South Africa illustrates the need
for structural reparations to address the systemic exclusion of
Blacks from land ownership, political participation, and economic
ownership for most of the twentieth century.138 Rather than simply
assessing South Africa’s reparations policies, this Article will
discuss the limitations of traditional reparations approaches and
explore the possibility of remedying past injustices using a
structured, institution-based approach. Although this Article uses
South Africa as an example where this approach is being tested,
space does not allow for a full-scale assessment of the quality and
sufficiency of the government’s implementation of the program.
Instead, this Article serves to highlight the way that an
institutional-based approach to reparations, rather than an
individual-based approach, can address those structural injustices
neglected by traditional reparations approaches while
simultaneously fostering the moral agency of victims.

137 For a detailed discussion of the role of economic, political, and educational
institutions in providing reparations for slavery and segregation to African
Americans, see Carlton Waterhouse, The Full Price of Freedom: African American
Responsibility to Repair the Harms of Slavery and Segregation (Aug. 2006)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University) (on file with author)
(discussing in detail the role of economic, political, and educational institutions in
providing reparations for slavery and segregation to African Americans).
138 HEATHER DEEGAN, THE POLITICS OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA: APARTHEID AND
AFTER 3–67 (2001). The Australian aborigines, the Native Americans of North
America, and African Americans represent additional groups who would benefit
from structural reparations designed to produce long-term remediation of long
standing injustices. See generally WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 1.
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South Africa’s Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Act directed the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) to consider matters
referred to it by the Committee on Human Rights Violations and
the Committee on Amnesty, in addition to its responsibility for
recommending “urgent interim measures” for qualifying
victims.139 Through these provisions, the legislation directed the
Committee to consider individual applications for reparations and
then determine awards for the victims of “gross violation[s] of
human rights” that were consistent with the testimony received
from the two other committees comprising the TRC.140 In theory,
this two-tiered focus would allow the Reparations and
Rehabilitation Committee to match individual reparations
investigations with the corresponding testimony of victims
regarding gross human rights violations and perpetrators in
pursuit of amnesty.141 This process did not work as originally
contemplated, however, since the provision of reparations
experienced considerable delays relative to the grants of
amnesty.142
139 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 ss.
25(1)(a)(i)(aa)–25(1)(a)(i)(bb), 25(1)(b)(i) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Promotion of
National Unity Act], available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm.
See also Penelope E. Andrews, Reparations for Apartheid’s Victims: the Path to
Reconciliation?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1155, 1163–65 (2004) (describing how South
Africa created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to aid in addressing the
issue of reparations).
140 Promotion of National Unity Act 34 of 1995 s. 25(1)(a)(i)–(1)(b)(i). This
group of roughly 20,000 victims identified by the TRC pursuant to the statute
contrasts with the millions of Black South Africans who suffered daily human
rights abuses under apartheid from 1960 to 1994. See also Erin Daly, Reparations in
South Africa: A Cautionary Tale, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 367, 394–396 (2003) (arguing
that in order for financial reparations to be implemented there must be a reasoned
basis for relief).
141 Promotion of National Unity Act, s. 25(1)(a)(i). See also Marianne Geula,
Note, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an Alternative Means of
Addressing Transitional Government Conflicts in a Divided Society, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J.
57, 65–68 (2000) (describing the purpose and obligations of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission).
142 ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 334–35 (2000). Although the first Urgent Interim
Reparations award took place in July 1998, from 1996 to 1998 the TRC had ruled
on almost 200 amnesty applications. Members of the Reparations Committee
expressed frustration that human rights violators received amnesty for their
crimes long before their victims received reparations. Cf. Geula, supra note 141
(describing the purpose and obligations of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission).
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Ultimately, the TRC submitted a host of recommendations
addressing the individual needs of victims, their relatives, and
communities in addition to the broader society.143 Regarding the
larger society, the TRC proposed the following: affirmative action
programs for the business sector generally and the media sector
specifically, the creation of a business reconciliation fund to finance
Black
entrepreneurship,
land
redistribution
measures,
compensation for loss of businesses or wages during the unrest of
the 1980s and 1990s, and a mandatory scheme requiring restitution
by business “for those who have suffered from the effects of
apartheid discrimination.”144
In 1998 the TRC offered the
following in its final report:
The road to reconciliation, therefore, means both material
reconstruction and the restoration of dignity. It involves the
redress of gross inequalities and the nurturing of respect for
our common humanity. It entails sustainable growth and
development in the spirit of ubuntu . . . It implies wideranging structural and institutional transformation and the
healing of broken human relationships.
It demands
guarantees that the past will not be repeated. It requires
restitution and the restoration of our humanity—as
individuals, as communities and as a nation.145
To this end, the TRC recommended two forms of reparations
for those persons it certified as claimants.146 The Reparations and
Rehabilitation committee of the TRC recommended immediate
reparations, titled “Urgent Interim Reparations,” for those facing
pressing needs at the time the Commission submitted its first
report, and a long-term reparations program, titled Individual
Reparations Grants, requiring payments over a six-year term for
the entire class of recipients.147
The interim reparations
143 5 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 170–95
[hereinafter TRC REPORT VOL. 5].
144 TRC REPORT VOL. 5, supra note 143, at 304–49. See also Alfred L. Brophy,
Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 497, 499 (2003) (noting that discussions regarding affirmative action and
discussions regarding reparations are often the same discussion).
145 6 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 138
[hereinafter TRC REPORT VOL. 6].
146 Id.
147 TRC REPORT VOL. 6, supra note 145, at 165. See also Daly, supra note 145, at
391–92 (discussing the entities that would help deliver reparations to victims).
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recommended took the form of compensation for health care,
education, housing, welfare and other services and included
compensation as high as R12,000 (approximately U.S. $1,630).148
However, after receiving the final volume of the TRC report on
April 15, 2003, the President’s Fund decided to provide a one-time
payment of R30,000 (approximately U.S. $3,842) to the 19,000
designated victims, totaling U.S. $85 million.149 Under the TRC
recommendation, however, the government would have provided
up to R2.8 billion for Individual Reparations Grants (totaling $360
million U.S.).150 This difference resulted from a philosophical
disagreement between President Thabo Mbeki and the TRC
regarding financial priorities and the benefits of individual
reparations grants. President Mbeki viewed individual grants in
the least favorable light, arguing that the transformation of society
would be the best form of reparations for the victims of
apartheid.151 The TRC, in contrast, viewed individual reparation
grants as an important symbolic and material response to the
victims of apartheid for the injustices they had suffered at the
hands of the previous government.152 Therefore, in addition to
recommending that victims be awarded reparation grants for the
injustice they had suffered, South Africa’s TRC included a
Committee on Reparations and Rehabilitation that also
recommended symbolic reparations.153
Despite the substantial recommendations by the Committee,
South Africa’s reparations process “has generated significant

148 TRC REPORT VOL. 6, supra note 145, at 172. See also Susan Ayres, Hélène
Cixous’s The Perjured City: Nonprosecution Alternatives to Collective Violence, 9 N.Y.
CITY L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2005) (explaining that many believed TRC acknowledging
victims’ stories was affirming and healing for those victimized and characterizing
TRC as an engine for collective healing).
149 Thabo Mbeki, President, South African, Statement to the National Houses
of Parliament and the Nation at the Tabling of the Report of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 7 (Apr. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Mbeki, Report of the
TRC],
available
at
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2003/appendices
/030610presrec.htm.
150 Brandon Hamber, Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South
Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1074, 1079 (2003).
151 Mbeki, Report of the TRC, supra note 149. See Hamber, supra note 150, at
1079 (discussing the decision of President Mbeki to award a lower amount than
recommended by the TRC Report).
152 TRC REPORT VOL. 6, supra note 145, at 105–09; Ayres, supra note 148, at 28.
153 Rose, supra note 57, at 387 (detailing that symbolic reparations might
include memorials, reburials, renaming of streets and days of remembrance).
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dissatisfaction among victims.”154 First, the government was very
slow to respond to the TRC’s recommendations about payments.155
Second, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act,
which authorized the formation of the TRC and outlined its
responsibilities, included no requirements for reparations from the
actual perpetrators or other beneficiaries of apartheid.156
Under the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, millions of South
Africans arguably qualified for compensation based on physical
and mental harm; lost opportunities; moral damage; and legal and
medical expenses.157
The TRC reparations grants paled in
comparison to the harms inflicted on South African Blacks, yet an
award of compensation to the majority of South Africans was also
untenable.158 The harms of apartheid could not be meaningfully
redressed by a single R30,000 grant or a six year R23,000 award.159
Apartheid robbed the majority of South Africans of the skills
and opportunities needed to participate fully in the economic
sector of South African society.160 In 1998, 85% of the country’s
managers were white while, in addition, whites made up 93% and
92% respectively of the senior and executive managers.161 Blacks
made up 15% of all levels of management and Native African
women accounted for only 6% of the country’s managers, though
women represented roughly 35% of all management levels.162 Of
South Africans whose income reached R6,401 or more per month,
Id. at 387–88.
Id. at 387.
156 Id.
157 See TRC REPORT VOL. 6, supra note 145, at 160–61; see also Basic Principles
and Guidelines Resolution, supra note 133.
158 See TRC REPORT VOL. 6, supra note 145, at 161 (noting that, given its limited
resources, providing reparations to over 20 million Black South Africans was not
feasible); see also Rose, supra note 57, at 387–88 (asserting that despite TRC’s
recommendations, the reparations process in South Africa has not been
satisfactory in the eyes of the victims).
159 See Rose, supra note 57, at 387 n.323 (detailing the Committee’s proposed
compensation to vicitims); see also Mbeki, Report of the TRC, supra note 149
(stating that a R30,000 grant would be provided to those victims designated by the
TRC).
160 Mbeki, Report of the TRC, supra note 149.
161 DEEGAN, supra note 138, at 120.
162 Id.
154
155
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whites outnumbered Africans three to one, though in population
Africans outnumbered whites eight to one.163 At the bottom of the
income scale, the inverse was true: of South Africans making less
than R1,600 per month, Blacks outnumbered whites eighteen to
one.164
To address the legacy of apartheid, the government passed a
series of laws.165 These include: the Higher Education Act, the
Skills Development Act, the Employment Equity Act, the Black
Economic Empowerment Act, the Land Restitution and Reform
Act, Restitution of Land Rights Act, and the Land Reform (“Labour
Tenants”) Act.166 Although each of these address some reparative
purpose relative to the history of apartheid, the rest of this Article
will focus on the Employment Equity Act and the Black Economic
Empowerment Act because of their direct relation to the society’s
economic institutions. Each of these statutes will be described in
brief, including the reparative function they perform, before
discussing the combined impact of the individual programs.
4.1. The Employment Equity Act and the Black Economic
Empowerment Act
The Employment Equity Act establishes affirmative
employment practices for training and hiring suitable persons from
designated groups.167 For companies with fifty or more employees
163 775,165 whites in South Africa earned R6401 per month or more.
In
contrast, only 223,116 Native Africans did so. For every Native African making
R6,401 or more per month, there were three whites making as much or more.
STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA, CENSUS 2001: PRIMARY TABLES SOUTH AFRICA 74 tbl.16.3
(2001), available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/HTML/RSAPrimary
.pdf.
164 4,241,371 native Blacks make R1,600 or less per month. Only 237,505
whites made R1,600 or less per month. Accordingly, for every white person
making R1,600 or less per month, there are eighteen Blacks in the same income
range. Id.
165 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (S. Afr.); Land
Restitution and Reform Amendment Act 18 of 1999 (S. Afr.); Skills Development
Act 97 of 1998 (S. Afr.); Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (S. Afr.); Higher
Education Act 101 of 1997 (S. Afr.); Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996
(S. Afr.); Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 (S. Afr.)..
166 Id. See also F. Michael Higginbotham, Affirmative Action in the United States
and South Africa: Lessons From the Other Side, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 187, 213–
14 (1999) (describing the support for affirmative action and the Employment
Equity Act in South Africa).
167 Designated groups consist of Black South Africans, women, and people
with disabilities. Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 s. 5.1 (S. Afr.). Black South
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or with substantial annual receipts for their industry, the Act
requires numerical goals and preferential treatment to ensure
equitable representation.168
The Act directs employers to
implement measures identifying and eliminating employment
barriers that adversely affect people from designated groups;
further diversity in the workplace; make reasonable
accommodation for people from designated groups to ensure
representation; and implement appropriate training measures.169
The specified purpose of the Employment Equity Act includes:
“Implementing affirmative action measures to redress the
disadvantages in employment experienced by designated groups,
in order to ensure their equitable representation in all occupational
categories and levels in the workforce.”170 As a reparative
measure, the Act seeks to create job opportunities and training
across professions and career paths for Blacks excluded from
occupying most positions under apartheid.171 The goal of the Act
is to bring the masses of the South African population slowly into
offices, positions, and career paths consistent with their numerical
representation within the society.172
In South Africa, this means the reversal of a century-long
structural exclusion of these groups from gaining the training and
skills required for these jobs, as well as the economic benefit of the
higher salaries they provide.
Because the Act mandates
implementation at all levels for designated employers, its faithful
implementation will racially reform those institutions, ensuring
that the victims of apartheid benefit from the power and positions
Africans include native Africans, Indians, and people of color. See generally Karin
van Marle, “Meeting the World Halfway”—The Limits of Legal Transformation, 16 FLA.
J. INT’L L. 651, 658–60 (2004) (discussing the limitations of the definition of
designated groups in the context of employment integration).
168 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 s. 5.1 (S. Afr.) (“designated employer).
169 Id. s. 15(2).
170 Id. s. 2.
171 Id. s. 2 (noting that the Act seeks to create jobs for South African Blacks).
But see Elizabeth Hoffman, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Discrimination Against the
Majority Undermines Equality, While Continuing to Benefit Few Under the Guise of
Black Economic Empowerment, 36 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 87, 103–04 (2008)
(referencing Phinda Madi, a well known Black critic of Broad-Based Black
Economic Empowerment, who argues that while a job would be extremely
empowering for most South Africans, Black Empowerment has created almost no
new jobs but rather has reinforced the economic divides put in place by apartheid
without adding a mechanism to destroy them).
172 See Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 s. 2 (S. Afr.) (calling for a workforce
representative of the South African people).
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from which they were excluded. Although the process will likely
take a generation or more for completion due to the extreme level
of deprivation caused by apartheid, it ultimately places Blacks,
along with whites, in control of the economic institutions of the
nation. This program operates primarily as an individual rather
than communal-based approach to reparations, however, the
transfer of power within these institutions to the former victims of
apartheid results in the redistribution of the benefits associated
with their operation, as well as those gained from the positions
held within them. In the South African context, where the
apartheid victims constitute the majority of the population, this
methodology addresses a significant aspect of the group-based
injury caused by apartheid. The status, money, and power
associated with positions obtained through the Act directly reverse
the former denial of the same positions based on race.
Substantial debate exists regarding the benefits of affirmative
action and related programs in both the United States and South
Africa. As a nation in transition, South Africa’s approach may be
viewed as unique to situations of transitional justice andd
inapplicable to other frameworks.173 However, the distinction
between ordinary and transitional justice should not be
overstated.174 South Africa employs affirmative action along with a
host of other reparative programs, all of which should be viewed
as part of a comprehensive strategy to redress the harms of
apartheid.175 The program in the United States originated along

173 For an examination of transitional justice theory see RUTI TEITEL,
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000).
174 A rigid distinction between transitional and ordinary periods neglects the
dynamic nature of justice and the importance of backward-looking justice, not just
in transitional periods but at all times. See Aeyal M. Gross, The Constitution,
Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice: Lessons From South Africa and Israel, 40 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 47, 50–52 (2004) (critiquing Teitel and the theory of transitional justice).
175 The debate over affirmative action as a tool for addressing historic
injustices continues. See THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE
WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 166–84 (2004); see also, FAYE J. CROSBY, AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION IS DEAD: LONG LIVE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 221–39 (2004) (discussing and
evaluating the debate over affirmative action). For a favorable examination of
affirmative action policies in the United States and South Africa see
Higginbotham, supra note 166; see also Adila Hassim, Affirmative Action Policies in
The United States and South Africa: A Comparative Study, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW
TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 119 (2000) (comparing the history and positive functions of
affirmative action in the United States and South Africa).
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similar lines.176 Because of the historic discrimination against
Blacks and others, the American government instituted affirmative
action in hiring and contracting in the wake of the civil rights
movement as a way to remedy the discrimination of the past.177
However, South African programs should be distinguished
from the United States’ affirmative action program on two primary
bases: the continued minority status of Black beneficiaries in the
U.S. context; and the limited scope of the American program.
Affirmative action in the United States could have functioned
reparatively to remedy some harm of slavery and segregation;
however, as designed and implemented it failed to do so.178 The
continued minority status of Blacks in the United States, coupled
with the persistence of racism, restricted the ability of Blacks to
gain offices and positions in American society that they and their
ancestors were denied based on race. The limited scope of
mandatory affirmative action in America further exemplifies this
point. Affirmative action regulation was restricted to government
positions and contractors and never applied to large segments of
the private sector.179 Furthermore, even the affirmative action
programs guiding government contracting only resulted in a five
percent set-aside under some federal programs for women,
minorities, and other small disadvantaged businesses combined,
though they comprise the majority of the country’s population.180
The South African program, in contrast, places the country’s
vast resources in the hands of the former victims, providing them
with an institutional structure to support the long-term
remediation of the harms of apartheid.181 This is not to suggest
that affirmative action should be viewed as a panacea or even a
potential cure for all of South Africa’s ills. Rather, this Article
seeks to emphasize the program’s potential to provide new
176 See PHILIP RUBIO, A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: 1619—2000, at 135–
166 (2001) (detailing the advent and development of affirmative action from 1955
through 1993).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 188 (estimating the damage of slavery as far exceeding the value of
all benefits accorded Blacks in subsequent years).
179 See ROY L. BROOKS, GILBERT PAUL CARRASCO & GORDON A. MARTIN, JR.,
CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 1071–1171 (1995) (examining affirmative action case law).
180 See the National Defense Authorization Act for 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-661, §
1207, 100 Stat. 3973–75 (establishing a 5% contract goal on Department of Defense
awards to small disadvantaged businesses).
181 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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opportunities to large numbers of South Africans that will enable
them to take an active role in redressing the historic discrimination
of the South African employment sector through their role in
staffing and managing the nation’s businesses.
The Black
Economic Empowerment Act (“BEE”) also promotes an
institutional approach to remedying apartheid’s harms. Under the
terms of this Act, companies doing business with the South African
government or any organ of the state for procurement, licensing, or
public-private partnerships, must diversify their equity ownership
to include Blacks at levels set by the cabinet members that oversee
the particular industries.182 The Act has increased integration and
Black South Africans have become increasingly empowered in the
business sector since 1994. Some Blacks occupy positions in senior
management or on the Boards of Directors of South African
companies.183 However, as Tangri and Southall note:
It has also been observed that the number of black
managers in the private sector is still small and black
people are hardly in controlling positions in capital. In an
October 2005 report released by the Black Business
Executive Circle, it was recorded that only five of the
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (“JSE”) top 200
companies had black ownership of more than 51 percent,
only 27 companies had more than 25 percent, and these 32
companies together accounted for less than 2 percent of the
JSE’s market capitalization.184
Along with set targets, officials use a scorecard that
examines the following indicators of economic involvement: direct
empowerment through ownership and control of enterprises and
assets; procurement from the aforementioned designated groups;
the development of enterprises involving designated groups; and
corporate investment that benefits members and communities from
182 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 s. 9 (S. Afr.).
See generally Daniel M. Ludlam, From Mandela and MLK to BEEcom and the SBA:
Laying the Groundwork For Equality Through Business Development Programs in South
Africa and the United States, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 369, 389–90 (2007)
(discussing the importance of achieving the goals advanced by the preamble of
the BEE).
183 See Roger Tangri & Roger Southall, The Politics of Black Economic
Empowerment in South Africa, 34 J.S. AFR. STUD. 699, 700 (2008) (discussing the
changes in Black South African involvement in the business sector).
184 Id. at 700.
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the designated groups and other workforce-related categories.185
This program could provide substantial institutional reparations
through redistributing ownership of South Africa’s corporations to
the victims of apartheid.
Criticisms of the BEE abound. Substantial challenges exist to
enable it to meet its potential.186 Because the program has turned
some ANC elites into instant millionaires, critics see it as a vehicle
for enriching the party faithful rather than a genuine means of
transforming South African society.187 The early criticism of the
BEE’s exclusive enrichment of a few individuals seems well placed.
To meet its reparative potential, the benefit of equity ownership in
South Africa’s businesses must be spread across those
communities and groups harmed by apartheid in order to remedy
the exclusionary practices of the previous political and economic
regime. In response to the perceived abuse and the narrow initial
approach to the program, the government has more recently
directed the program to communities, civil society, and workers.
This approach flows from the adoption of a broad-based BEE
(“BBBEE”) “aimed at redressing the imbalances of the past by
seeking to substantially and [sic] equitable transfer ownership,
management, and control of South Africa’s financial and economic
resources to the majority of its citizens.”188 However:

185 Id. at 706. See also S. AFR. DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, SOUTH AFRICA’S
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION: A STRATEGY FOR BROAD-BASED BLACK ECONOMIC
EMPOWERMENT 4–12 (2003), available at http://www.thedti.gov.za/bee/bee.htm
(studying the lasting influences of apartheid, and the success of BEE initiatives to
achieve economic integration).
186 As a part of the ANC’s adoption of a neo-liberal market philosophy to
transform South African society, the BEE faces many of the same criticisms. See
IAN TAYLOR, STUCK IN MIDDLE GEAR: SOUTH AFRICA’S POST APARTHEID FOREIGN
RELATIONS 67–83 (2001) (analyzing and critiquing the ANC’s move away from
their more radical socialist ideology to a right-of-center economic approach that
protects business and investment); HEIN MARAIS, SOUTH AFRICA: LIMITS TO
CHANGE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSITION 160–95 (2001) (explaining how
the ANC, like many other such movements quickly adopted a less drastic, more
business and capital friendly economic structure after assuming power).
187 William M. Gumede, Down to Business But Nothing to Show, in THABO
MBEKI’S WORLD: THE POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT 207–
10 (Sean Jacobs & Richard Calland eds., 2002) (noting that many BEE measures
benefit a small elite—often comprised of former ANC members who left politics
to pursue business—at the expense of the Black majority); See also Tangri &
Southall, supra note 183, at 704 (highlighting the failure to the BEE initiatives to
achieve meaningful integration of Blacks into the white economy).
188 Gumede, supra note 187, at 214.
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While BBBEE was created to make South Africa’s economy
more representative of the demographic makeup of the
country, major structural flaws have continued to
disempower the black majority. These flaws include, but
are not limited to, the focus on black ownership and
management, lack of mandatory compliance with BBBEE
policy, the economic rise of “black diamonds,” and the
continuation of a small class of economic dominance.189
Succeeding in this task presents a challenge that will require
greater governmental monitoring and private sector cooperation
than has occurred so far.190 The potential offered by the program
to redress some of the economic harms of apartheid and to enable
its former victims to own, control, and participate in the
institutions that once excluded them, underscores the potential of
institutional based reparations to redress deep structural inequities
untouched by the prevailing models of reparations.191 In short,
institutionally-based reparations that focus on providing the
former victims of human rights abuses with the ability to own and
manage the resources from which they were formerly excluded
represent an important and under-explored reparations
mechanism.192
Beyond the position, status, and income redistributed by the
Employment Equity Act, the BBBEE can potentially redistribute
wealth in South African society and the power that accompanies it.
Moreover, this institutional mechanism for addressing the harms
of apartheid in South Africa highlights the way that institutional
reparations can alter the fundamental distribution of goods in a
society and its communities. Together these two Acts, taken along
with political reforms that place the former apartheid victims in
Hoffman, supra note 171, at 96.
Gumede, supra note 187, at 215–16 (explaining that critical to Mbeki’s probusiness strategy is greater willingness from the government and the middle
management sector to cooperate in the transformative change of South African
business and society).
191 Id.
192 This approach fits into the transformative model of justice that focuses on
institutional changes that transform the society at multiple levels rather than a
mere governmental transition. See Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting A
Path To Reconciliation, 12 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 73, 74 (2002) (explaining the role of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in transforming South African society as a
whole, in contrast to mere top-down regulations that allow a transition of power
without deeper transformation of society).
189
190
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positions of power, can change the institutional structure of the
South African economic sector.
The distinctness of these
institutional approaches underscores my argument that
reparations focused on reforming or creating institutional
structures can create a wealth of new opportunities for harmed
communities, their individual members, and the societies in which
they operate.
Moreover, unlike the passive receipt of
compensation, participation in South Africa’s institutionally based
programs can empower victims to engage their society as political
and economic agents who play a vital role in shaping its future.
Clearly, the successful implementation of institutional schemes in
the South African context also faces many challenges.193
5.

CONCLUSION

This Article’s analysis suggests the use of measures as criteria
for assessing reparations programs. Although a full elaboration of
such measures will be the subject of future research, a brief
consideration of some essential measures is in order. Scope, scale,
structural inclusion, accessibility, and procedural inclusiveness
serve as significant criteria for assessing reparations programs and
the role of victims within them. The scope of a program describes
the range of harms redressed within a reparations scheme.
Programs that exclusively address limited types of harm such as
property loss or physical injury have a narrow scope. The Asian
Women’s Fund established for victims of the Japanese Army was
very narrow in its scope.194 In contrast, programs that recognize
and respond to an assortment of harms flowing from human rights
abuses are broad in scope. Scale speaks to the substantive value or
depth of the redress provided. This measure focuses on the
amount or extent of redress. The compensation scheme used in
Argentina that provided former detainees with awards based on
mid to high level civil servant salaries called for high scale
redress.195 Structural inclusiveness relates to the breadth of victims
193 See generally MARAIS, supra note 186 (assessing the substantial obstacles
facing the ANC’s market-based approach to societal transformation); GUY
ARNOLD, THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA (2000) (discussing the huge political and
economic changes in South Africa from 1994 to 1998, and considering the vast
challenges facing the country under Mbeki’s rule).
194 WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 1, at 128–131.
195 Guembe, supra note 80, at 31–44 (2006) (explaining that for each day of
proven detention, victims received 1/30 the monthly salary of the highest paid
category of civil servants).
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covered under a program. One of the biggest shortcomings of the
FRG reparations program was its exclusion of whole classes of
victims such as the Roma who also suffered under the Nazi
regime.196 Argentina, in contrast, extended its program to the
broadest range of victims; achieving a high degree of structural
inclusiveness.197 Procedural inclusiveness examines the level of
victim involvement in reparations program development. The
Federal Republic of Germany’s negotiation of reparations terms
with Jewish victim’s groups in the wake of World War II
demonstrates significant procedural inclusiveness although the
range of victim classes involved was limited. The accessibility
assesses victims’ ability to obtain or make use of reparations. The
Indian Claims Commission as a mechanism for redress represented
the lowest degree of accessibility; it forced victims to conform to a
highly bureaucratic adversarial process foreign to them and their
way of life.198 Overall, it impeded rather than facilitated redress.
This failure to attend to the basic needs of the programs
beneficiaries reflects the frequent shortcoming of reparations
programs from victims’ perspectives. By reframing program
development in light of victims’ needs and perspectives, future
programs will hopefully lead to more “good” if not better
reparations programs. Making sure that all victims can take
advantage of opportunities and participate equally in reforms,
minimizing resentment held by other members of society not
directly benefiting from reparative programs, and ensuring that
new or reformed institutions deal fairly and openly within the
society represent a few of the many difficulties that reparations
programs need to address. Developing more inclusive reparations
programs that engage victims in their design and implementation
serves an overlooked but important role in the process of
redressing historic injustices.

196 Kim, supra note 10, at 77 (emphasizing that the failure of the German
reparations program was the classes of victims excluded from the process who
have “suffered in relative silence”).
197 Guembe, supra note 80.
198 Newton, supra note 79, at 262–64.
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